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The Suspension Clause in the Ratification
Debates
ERIC M.
I.

FREEDMANt

INTRODUCTION

The issue of the proper scope of the federal writ of habeas
corpus has for the past several decades generated repeated political
struggles in the judicial, legislative, and executive arenas.1 The
prominence of this seemingly arcane legal question is not difficult
to explain; it implicates a series of fundamental issues of public
policy: crime control, civil liberties, the allocation of power and responsibility between branches and levels of government, and the
justice and efficacy of the criminal justice system, particularly with
regard to the death penalty.
Yet the habeas corpus debate has taken place in the context of
an astonishing dearth of historical knowledge.2 This phenomenon
results from the fact that the field has fallen into an uneasy scholarly void between law and history. It is too technically complex to
be studied by those lacking a serious legal background, but lawyers
are ill-suited for the pursuit because reported judicial opinions-the lawyer's primary research source-are an "unreliable indication of the actual extent of habeas corpus litigation and the
types of restraints for which the writ was issued."
An illustration of the situation is provided by our entire inability to provide a satisfactory answer to the question: What was
the intended meaning of the Suspension Clause of the Constitut Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Lawemf@vaxc.Hofstra.edu).
B.A. 1975, Yale University; M.A. 1977, Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand);
J.D. 1979, Yale University. I am grateful to Nancy A. Grasser for her devoted secretarial
assistance; to my research assistant, Michael Kneis of the Hofstra Law School class of 1997;"
and to Hofstra University for its financial support of this project.

1. For a summary of these prior to the Republican capture of Congress in the November, 1994 elections, see Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S.CAL. L.RE v. 2331
(1993). As of the date this Symposium was held, see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 381 (1996), and the report of the Association of

the Bar of the City of New York, The Crisis in CapitalRepresentation (Mar. 1996), 51 REC.
Ass'N B. Crry N.Y. 169, 174-76, 191-98 (1996).
2. See LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMNG THE FEDERAL COURTS 155-56 (1994).

3. Dalin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHi. L.REv. 243, 256
(1965).
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tion? 4 This straightforward inquiry has met with a tangled variety
of proposed answers 5 The two current leading candidates are:
(a) The Clause was meant to prevent Congress from limiting
federal judicial review of the confinements of those in federal custody. This interpretation has the sanction of Chief Justice John
Marshall.' But, at least in his version (i.e. that the Clause requires
that Congress provide the writ to federal prisoners by statute), this
view faces the obstacle that Congress could violate the Constitution simply by doing nothing; the failure to provide a statutory
mechanism for federal prisoners to obtain the writ would work a
suspension. In Marshall's words, "the privilege itself would
be lost,
'7
although no law for its suspension should be enacted."
(b) The Clause was meant to prevent Congress from limiting
state judicial review of the confinements of those in federal custody.' Notwithstanding its historical plausibility, this interpretation was rejected with some vigor by the Supreme Court in the
middle of the last century,9 and doubtless still would be today.
There are, of course, two other logical possibilities:
(c) The Clause was meant to prevent Congress from limiting
federal review of the confinements of state prisoners. Although
there is excellent reason to think that the Clause should be so interpreted today,10 the argument that this interpretation is reflec4. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it." There is similar ambiguity surrounding the Clause's predecessor, a proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation that would have created "a federal Judicial Court for
trying and punishing all Officers appointed by Congress for all crimes, offenses, and Misbehavior in their Offices ... provided that the trial of the fact by Jury shall ever be held
sacred, and also the benefits of the writ of Habeas Corpus . . ." See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saldino eds., 1984) [hereinafter DocubtENTARY HISTORY] (Proposed Article 19, submitted to
the Confederation Congress on August 7, 1786 by a committee appointed to consider improvements in the Articles, but not taken up by the full body). This proposal could plausibly bear interpretation (a) or (b) discussed in the next paragraph of text, or both (a) and

(b).
5. The four possibilities set forth below are by no means mutually exclusive, and, with
greater or lesser degrees of plausibility, one could argue for any combination of them. Thus,
for example, Professor Paschal's article described infra note 11, argues for (a) and (c).
6. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
7. Id. at 95.
8. See WiLLiAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126-56 (1980);
Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509 (1987).
9. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506 (1858).
10. See 1 JAMEs S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 7.2d (2d ed., 1994); Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is
There a ConstitutionalRight to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?,92 MICH.
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tive of the original intent appears inconsistent with the terms of
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides:
That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol,
unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the
United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or
are necessary to be brought into court to testify.11

(d) The Clause was meant to prevent Congress from limiting
the right of state judges to issue the writ to state prisoners. No one
has suggested this, probably because the concept is so counter-intuitive to modern ways of thinking, but it is not entirely implausible. There was, after all, intense fear in the states about the tyrannical potential of the new federal government, fear that lead to the
creation of the Bill of Rights, and a belief among at least some
ratifiers that the Clause gave the federal government a general
power to suspend state habeas corpus laws.12 Yet, although the
states already had a well-developed structure of habeas corpus protections,13 their proposals to Congress for a Bill of Rights did not
contain suggestions for safeguarding it against federal interference. 14 A very reasonable deduction is that they believed that the
Suspension Clause had already done the job effectively.
In a first effort 5 to shed some light on these obscurities, I
have recently undertaken a preliminary survey of the public discussion of habeas corpus, in state conventions and in the pamphlet
L.REv. 862, 871-74 (1994); Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 451, 466 (1990-1991).

Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Schup v. Delo, 115 S.Ct. 851, 875 (1995), which observes that "the very broad limits set by the Suspension Clause" constrain the Court's
power to curtail federal habeas corpus review of state convictions, adopts this reading.
11. First Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat 73, 81-82 (1789). See generally Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136, 174-75 (1926) (setting forth reasons why actions of First
Congress are regarded "as of the greatest weight in the interpretation" of the Constitution).
Nonetheless, the word "appears" is used in the text advisedly. In an extremely persuasive
article, Professor Francis Paschal attacked the reading of the statute advanced by Bollman,
supra note 6, and argued that state prisoners had a constitutional right to habeas
corpus-an argument that led the Congress in 1968 to reject a proposed statute that would
have denied state prisoners the right to assert constitutional claims in the federal courts
except on direct appeal. Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DuKE
L.J. 605.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
13. See Steiker, supra note 10, at 872 n.43.
14. For a fuller discussion see infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
15. This is the beginning step in a larger project. I am presently at work on a book on
the history of habeas corpus, projected to be published during 1998. I hope that by then my
thinking will have been enriched by the reactions of other students to these initial thoughts.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

literature, at the time the Constitution was ratified."8
Of course, coming to some conclusion as to the views of contemporaries on the meaning of the Suspension Clause will hardly
conclude the question of what it does or should mean today. Leaving entirely aside the whole debate as to the degree to which original intent should bind present interpretation, 17 all such inquiries
have to struggle with the reality that in many respects those who
attended the ratification conventions were far more ignorant of the
Constitution than we are,"' and, in any event, tended to disagree
among themselves.19 Nonetheless, in the belief that sounder Constitutional law emerges when we are aware of history than when we
are ignorant of it, I offer my findings here.
Briefly put:
It is possible to marshall isolated materials in support of each
of the positions outlined above. (These are collected in Part
II.B.1). But to proceed in this fashion is to risk engaging in classic
16. Cf. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796) (Remarks of James Madison) ("[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who formed our Constitution, the sense of
that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution. As
the instrument came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a plan .... If we were
to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we
must look for it... in the State Conventions."); Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the
Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CAL. L. REv. 235, 250-51, 258-74
(1989) (discussing range of sources used to determine original intent).
17. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTuTIOTN 373-97 (1990) (summarizing originalism debate).

18. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 12 TEE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 11-12 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).

Some men look at constitutions with a sanctimonious reverence, and deem them
like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of
the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be
beyond amendment I knew that age well; I belonged to it.... It was very like the
present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience
in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to arise from the dead.
Id.
19. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers:
The Limits of HistoricalAnalysis, 50 U. Prrr. L.REv. 349, 397 (1989) ("[O]n questions of
race there was vast disagreement among the men who participated in framing the Constitution of 1787."); Eric M. Freedman, The Law As King and the King as Law: Is a President
Immune from Criminal ProsecutionBefore Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, 1621 (1992) (detailing how founders disagreed over scope of Impeachment Clause).
In the present case, the ratifiers were ignorant of the key official and unofficial records
of the discussions in Philadelphia, which had not yet been published. See 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xi-xii (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (describing
sequence of publication of accounts of the proceedings). However, some of them were
plainly familiar with the accounts of the debate on the Suspension Clause that Luther Martin published immediately following the Convention. See infra text accompanying notes 2324, 55.
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"lawyer's history": collecting data to buttress a pre-conceived argument while ignoring the real drive behind the events generating
the data. The overwhelming theme emerging from the historical
materials has nothing to do with legal niceties; it is, rather, that
habeas corpus should be preserved in full vigor as a remedy-particularly for society's outcasts-against potential governmental abuses.
Specifically, the attacks on the Suspension Clause as it
emerged from the Convention fell into two groups.
First, some debaters used the existence of the Clause to attack
the Federalist premise that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary because the proposed federal government would have only those
powers specifically delegated to it. These arguments, described in
Part lI.B.2(a), offer little direct illumination on the questions laid
out above, but do reveal a strong underlying consensus as to the
importance of the writ.
Second, as Part II.B.2(b) describes, other debaters attacked
the Clause as permitting too much suspension of the writ, to which
supporters responded that they, too, expected the Clause to operate so as to protect unpopular individuals who might find themselves imprisoned.
This response appears to have been convincing to all parties,
since no further protections were added, or even proposed, during
the composition of the Bill of Rights. Thus, as Part III argues (and
Part IV briefly re-states), a holistic view of the history would be
that the participants in the ratification debates, were they among
us today, would support the independent judicial examination on
federal habeas corpus of all convictions, state or federal.

II.
A.

THE SOUNDS OF ARGUMENT

The Suspension Clause in Philadelphia

The history of the Clause at the Convention itself is sparse,
and, as the sources now stand, clear enough.
On August 20, 1787, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
moved that: "The privileges and benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious
and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the legislature
except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding - months. 2 0 The motion was referred
20. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTmON OF 1787, supra note 19, at 334, 340-42
(reprinting entry from Convention Journal of Aug. 20, 1787 and Madison's notes based
thereon).
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without debate to the Committee of Detail.2 1
When the matter returned to the Convention floor on August
28, Madison's notes record that:
Mr. Pinkney, urging the propriety of securing the benefits of the Habeas
corpus in the most ample manner, moved 'that it should not be suspended
but on the most urgent occasions, & then only for a limited time not exceeding twelve months'
Mr. Rutlidge was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolable-He did not
conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same time
through all the StatesMr. Govr. Morris moved that 'The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it'.
Mr. Wilson doubted whether in any case a suspension could be necessary, as
the discretion now exists with Judges, in most important cases to keep in
Gaol or admit to Bail.
The first part of Mr. Govr. Morris's motion, to the word 'unless' was agreed
to nem: con:-on the remaining part; N.H. ay. Mass ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del.
ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes-7; noes-3.] 2

Luther Martin of Maryland has left us further details of the
debate on this last motion (in which he sided with the minority):23
As the State governments have a power of suspending the habeas corpus act
[in cases of rebellion or invasion], it was said there could be no good reason
for giving such a power to the general government, since whenever the State
which is invaded or in which an insurrection takes place, finds its safety
requires it, it will make use of that power-And it was urged, that if we
gave this power to the general government, it would be an engine of oppression in its hands, since whenever a State should oppose its views, however
arbitrary and unconstitutional, and refuse submission to them, the general
government may declare it to be an act of rebellion, and suspending the
habeas corpus act, may seize upon the persons of those advocates of freedom, who have had virtue and resolution enough to excite the opposition,
and may imprison them during its pleasure in the remotest part of the
union, so that a citizen of Georgia might be bastiled in the furthest part of
New-Hampshire-or a citizen of New-Hampshire in the furthest extreme to
the south, cut off from their family, their friends, and their every connec21. Id.
22. Id. at 438.
23. See Address No. 11 of Luther Martin to the Citizens of Maryland (Mar. 21, 1788) in
16 DocuszNT~AsY HIsTORY, supra note 4, at 456.
It was my wish that the general government should not have the power of suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, as it appears to me altogether
unnecessary, and that the power given to it, may and will be used as a dangerous
instrument of oppression; but I could not succeed.
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tion-These considerations induced me, Sir, to give my negative also to this
24
clause.

The clause then moved to the Committee of Style and Arrangement, which substituted the word "when" for "where," resulting in the text we have today.2 5
B.

The Suspension Clause After Philadelphia

While the foregoing history is generally well-known, 6 recent
years have given scholars increased access to materials illuminating
the debates that took place once the Constitution was released to
the public. In a development that we should have learned by this
time to consider as less surprising than disappointing, the resulting
greater clarity of the historical picture has not been accompanied
by any greater insight into the specifics of original intention on
5
matters of particular interest today2S-as
those matters did not
happen to be the ones particularly in controversy among the debaters of the time. That fact, however, is itself illuminating. The
24. Luther Martin, Genuine Information VIII (Jan. 22, 1788), in 15 DocuMNTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 434. See also Luther Martin, Speech to the Maryland Assembly (Nov.
29, 1787), in 14 id. at 291.
Nothing could add to the mischievous tendency of this system more than the
power that is given to suspend the Act of Ha: Corpus-Those who could not approve of it urged that the power over the Ha: Corpus ought not to be under the
influence of the General Government. It would give them a power over Citizens of
particular States who should oppose their encroachments, and the inferior Jurisdictions of the respective States were fully competent to Judge on this important
privilege; but the Almighty power of deciding by a call for the question, silenced
all opposition to the measure as it too frequently did to many others.
25. See 2 THE REcoRDs Or THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 19, at 596
(reprinting Madison's copy of the committee's report of September 12, 1787).
26. For a detailed consideration, see Paschal, supra note 11, at 608-17. See also Mello
& Duffy, supra note 10, at 463-69.
27. This is primarily due to the continuing appearance of new volumes of the scholarly
and comprehensive DocusmNTARY HISTORY, supra note 4. This set, which attempts to
reproduce as fully as presently-known sources will allow all ratification-related material in
each state (including convention debates, published pamphlets and essays, and references in
private correspondence) is far superior in its breadth of coverage to THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTTuTiON (Jonathan

Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1866) [hereinafter ELLIOT's DEBATES], which has hitherto been the standard source. Hence, scholars may confidently anticipate the availability of more research
materials, if not necessarily of deeper insights, as volumes continue to be published in the
forthcoming years. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoples, Original Understanding, and ConstitutionalAmendment 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 148 n.151 (1996). In conducting my research for this Article, I have used the DocumENTARY HISTORY whenever
possible.
28. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Interpretingthe Constitution: Is the Intent of the
Framers Controlling?If Not, What Is?, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 35-36 (1995).
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shared premises of the political opponents may in this instance
teach us as much as their disagreements.
1. The Non-Issues. Since the scope of the writ preserved by
the Clause was not a matter of particular controversy, that issue
was only glancingly adverted to in the ratification debates-and
then exclusively by Federalists interested in showing that the
Clause did not grant the federal government too much power to
detain people arbitrarily. Thus, such discussion as took place had
to do with the federal power of imprisonment, not release, and the
limitations on the state power of release, not imprisonment.
As a result, what went undiscussed explicitly-as simply not
being on the radar screen of controversial issues-was the extent of
the federal courts' role in issuing the writ to state prisoners.2 9
Moreover, in reading that which was said, it would be anachronistic to assume that the debaters shared the view of the nineteenthcentury Supreme Court that state courts could not issue the writ
to federal prisoners.8 0
Thus, for instance, Judge Increase Sumner, supporting the
Constitution in the Massachusetts convention, stated: "Congress
have only the power to suspend the privilege to persons committed
by their authority. A person committed under authority of the
states will still have a right to this writ."-1 A lawyer taking the
modern view would read this as a statement that the Clause only
preserved a federal writ for federal prisoners. But, if one rejected
that premise, it could with equal plausibility be read as also making the statement that federal prisoners would retain the right to a
state writ.
Certainly, other debaters read the Clause as applying to the
issuance of the writ by state courts. Thus, for example, George
Nicholas told the Virginia convention that habeas corpus represented the sole instance in which Congress could "suspend our
laws."'3 2 Unfortunately, Nicholas did not indicate in his brief re29. A recent review of the field suggests that this issue "did not appear until after the
state-federal problems created by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850." Marc M. Arkin, The
Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70
TuL. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1995).
30. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
31. Increase Sumner, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 26,
1788), in 2 ELLioT's DEmATES, supra note 27, at 109.

32. George Nicholas, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9
Docu~mErTRx

HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1002. This was apparently also the view of the

Federalist pamphleteer, A Native of Virginia. See A Native of Virginia, Observations Upon
the Proposed Plan of Federal Government (Petersburg, Va., 1788), in id. at 691. See also
[Samuel] Adams, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 26, 1788), in 2
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marks whether he thought that "our laws" would in any event permit the issuance of state writs to federal prisoners. But at least one
Federalist ratifier in the same convention, Alexander White, was
explicit in the belief that the state courts' authority would extend
so far:
But should contests arise with respect to the extent of the respective jurisdictions the advantage is evidently on the side of the State governments. I
speak now of a legal contest. The Continental Courts will have no pre-emi-

nence; and... [t]he writ of habeas corpus gives a decided superiority to the
State courts in all cases where personal liberty is concerned, by referring to

their judgment, the legality of all imprisonments, incident to which is the
right of determining the amount of bail to be required, where the commitment is judged lawful.8

Thus, if one reads the history like a lawyer, searching for
scraps of data to support whatever argument is sought to be made,
one will find what lawyers usually do: some quotations that may be
plausibly deployed in support of any desired position, in this case
in support of various of the four positions described in Part I. But
to end the discussion there-concluding that the sparse record is
one of disagreement that has little to say on our issue-would be
to miss much, indeed most, of what the history could teach us.
Not all disagreements are born equal. In the case of the civil
and criminal immunity of an incumbent President, for example,
the members of the founding generation were at odds, knew that
they were, and recognized that their discord reflected a critical rift
of political philosophies between the disputants: "opposing premises as to the locus of national sovereignty, some placing it in the
'3 4
President and others in the People.
The case of the Suspension Clause differs in every respect.
The few isolated comments with respect to the intended scope of
the writ that was to be preserved were made by people who did not
engage one another directly (and, had they done so, might have
found that they in fact agreed), and who were addressing a minor
side issue in the broad themes of the debate over the Clause.
When one looks at the center rather than the periphery of that
debate, one finds that the participants did not disagree on fundamental political premises. In fact, they were united in their belief
that the maintenance of a vigorous writ was indispensable to political liberty. Discussions of the Clause revolved about the adequacy
ELLioT's DEBATEs, supra note 27, at 108.
33. Letter from Alexander White to the Winchester Gazette (Feb. 29, 1788), in 8 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 442.
34. Freedman, supra note 19, at 20.

460
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of the Constitutional text to achieve the shared goal of liberty
preservation. Unlike other such debates, the conclusion in this case
was that text did achieve the results that everyone desired, so that
no further safeguard was required in the eventual Bill of Rights.
Thus, it is in its areas of consensus as revealed by its silence
that the history speaks most clearly.
2. The Issues. Discussions of the Clause focused on the
power of suspension rather than on the nature of the writ-and for
good reason: those discussions did not occur in isolation, but rather
took place within the framework of two of the most controversial
issues regarding the proposed national government.
a. The Issue of Delegated Powers. It is familiar history that,
in response to the attack that the Constitution as it emerged from
the Convention lacked a Bill of Rights, the Federalists argued,
among other things, that the document did not need one, since
every power not explicitly granted to the national government was
s5
withheld from it.
Thus, for example, in No. 84 of The Federalist, Alexander
Hamilton argued that there was no need for a Bill of Rights, since
under the proposed Constitution "the people surrender nothing;
and as they retain everything they have no need of particular res35. See, e.g., George Nicholas, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10,
1788), in 9 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1135 ("But it is objected to for want of a
Bill of Rights. It is a principle universally agreed upon, that all powers not given, are retained."); Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788),
in id. at 1099.
As the prompt adoption of the Tenth Amendment suggests, this argument was far from
impregnable, since-apart from the considerations discussed in the text-it suffered from
the serious objection that the document nowhere explicitly stated that which Hamilton,
James Wilson, and other Federalists said that it meant. In a letter to James Madison that
survives in two versions, Thomas Jefferson made this point with some vigor. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 8 id. at 250; Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Uriah Forrest (Dec. 31, 1787), in 14 id. at 488, 489 (enclosing different
version of letter). See also Samuel Spencer, Speech to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLOT's DEBATES supra note 27, at 152.
The gentlemen said, all matters not given up by the form of government were
retained by the respective states. I know that it ought to be so; it is the general
doctrine, but it is necessary that it should be expressly declared in the Constitution and not left to mere construction and opinion .... The Confederation says,
expressly, that all that was not given up [to] the United States was retained by
the respective states. If such a clause had been inserted in this Constitution, it
would have superseded the necessity of a bill of rights. But that not being the
case, it was necessary that a bill of rights, or something of that kind, should be
part of the Constitution.
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ervations." 6 He continued by urging that the inclusion of a Bill of
Rights in the Constitution
would even be dangerous ....For why declare that things shall not be done
which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the
liberty of the press should not be restrained, when no power is given by
which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision
would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to
men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power. They
might urge with a semblance of reason that the Constitution ought not to be
charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority
which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty
of the press afforded a clear implication that a power to provide proper regulations concerning
it was intended to be vested in the national
37
government.

The structure and substance of the Suspension Clause enabled
opponents of the proposed Constitution to respond that the government was in fact not one of delegated powers. This issue, rather
than that of the scope of the writ, was at the heart of much of the
debate that took place over the Clause.
Thus, for example, John Smilie drew the attention of the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention to the clauses "expressly declaring that the writ of habeas corpus and the trial by jury in criminal
cases shall not be suspended or infringed," and asked: "How does
this indeed agree with the maxim that whatever is not given is reserved? Does it not rather appear from the reservation of these two

articles that everything else, which is not specified, is included in

the powers delegated to the government?" 3 8
Similarly, a prominent Anti-federalist pamphleteer in New

York wrote:
We find they have.., declared, that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless in cases of rebellion ....If every thing which is not given
is reserved, what propriety is there in [the exception]? Does this constitution any where grant the power of suspending the habeas corpus... ? It
certainly does not in express terms. The only answer that can be given is,
36. THE FDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See, e.g., James Iredell, Speech to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788),
in 4 ELLio's DEBATS, supra note 27, at 148 (Constitution "may be considered as a great
power of attorney, under which no power can be exercised but what is expressly given").
37. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 513-14. For a fuller description of the Federalists' position on this issue, see Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant
Paternity,1990 Sup. CT. REv. 301, 309-13.
38. John Smilie, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2
DocumENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 4, at 392.
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that these are implied in the general powers granted.
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In short, as Patrick Henry observed, the statement that the
writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended except in certain
cases meant that it could be suspended in the ones not covered;
the fact that the affirmative grant of power to do so was not contained in the Constitution, but needed to be implied, "is destructive of the doctrine advanced by the friends of that paper."'4 0
The Federalist response was to deny any inconsistency, claiming (with considerable plausibility in light of the Convention proceedings described above) 41 that, despite its negative phraseology,
the Clause was in fact a grant of power to the federal government.
Thus, the Federalist pamphleteer A Native of Virginia explained,
"that as the Congress can claim the exercise of no right which is
not expressly given them by this Constitution; they will have no
power to restrain the press in any of the States; and therefore it42
would have been improper to have taken any notice of it.'

Habeas corpus, on the other hand, presented a different case, one
which "corroborates this doctrine.

'4

With respect to that issue:

The Convention were sensible that a federal government would no more
have the right of suspending that useful law, without the consent of the
States than of restraining the liberty of the press: But at the same time they
knew that circumstances might arise to render necessary the suspension of
the habeas corpus act, and therefore, they require of the States, that they
44
will vest them with that power, whenever those circumstances shall exist.

In short, since the Suspension Clause was a grant of power to
the federal government (albeit an appropriately circumscribed
one), it did not represent a violation of the underlying principle
that any power not explicitly
granted to the federal government
45
was withheld from it.

For our purposes, the key point is that the Anti-federalists'
attack was not on the scope of the writ being protected by the Suspension Clause. They approved of that (as did the Federalists, of
39. Letter from Brutus 11 to New York Journal (November 1, 1787), in 13 id. at 524,
528. See William Grayson, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 16, 1788), in
10 id. at 1332 (making same argument).
40. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 17, 1788), in id.
at 1345-46.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
42. A Native of Virginia, supra note 32, at 691.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. For another Federalist response, see the two versions of Jasper Yeates' speech of
November 30, 1787 to the Pennsylvania convention in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
4, at 435, 437.
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course). The Anti-federalist argument, rather, was that the same
protections should have been given explicitly to other rights46 hence the need for a bill of rights.4 7
Thus, behind the disagreements over the delegated powers issue as it relates to the Clause lie much more significant agreements: that a vigorous writ was a key safeguard of liberty, and that
the writ protected by the proposed text was one broad enough to
serve that purpose.
b. The Issue of the Danger of Tyranny. The second major
point of the opponents of the Suspension Clause was that its grant
of power to the federal government was a dangerous one. This argument, of course, took place within the framework-long recognized by historians 4 5-- of a universal agreement among all political
debaters that, because human nature was inherently power-seeking, any grant of authority to government officeholders must be
scrutinized with extreme
care since they would inevitably attempt
49
to abuse the authority.
46. See Robert Whitehall, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28,
1787), in id. at 398-99. The cited pages contain two versions of this speech, which are consistent on our point, one recorded by Alexander J. Dallas and printed in the Pennsylvania
Herald of December 15, 1787, and the other captured in James Wilson's notes. Whitehall
reiterated his position in a speech on November 30. See Robert Whitehall, Speech to the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 30, 1787), in id. at 427.
47. See, e.g., Letter from a Federal Farmer 11 to the Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), in 14
id. at 42, 45-46; Smilie, supra note 38. See also Spencer, supra note 35.
48. See GORDON S. WOOD,THE CREATION OF THE AERIcAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 2122 (1969); JAMEs S. YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 1800-1828, at 55 (1961) ("Power
made men unscrupulous ....The possession of power was seen to unleash men's aggressive
instincts, and power-seeking was associated with antisocial behavior."); THE ANTIFEDERALisTS xxix (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966) ("Self-interest and.., a lust for power were anticipated."); Jack P. Greene, Ideas and the American Revolution, 17 AM. Q. 592, 594 (1965)
(reviewing PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Bernard Bailyn, ed. 1965)).

[A] dominant and comprehensive theory of politics had emerged in the colonies by
the middle of the eighteenth century. At the heart of this theory were the convictions that man in general could not withstand the temptations of power, that
power was by its very nature a corrupting and aggressive force, and that liberty
was its natural victim.
Id.; Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. &
MARY Q. 334, 334-35 (1982) (reviewing historical literature from 1960's through 1980's).
49. See, e.g., WILLIAM MACLAY, JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 82 (Edgar S. Maclay ed.,
1890) (entry for June 18, 1789: "It is the fault of the best governors, when they are placed
over a people, to endeavor to enlarge their powers ... ."); Broadside from A True Friend
(Richmond Dec. 5, 1787), in 14 DocumENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 373-74 ("[I]t is

unhappily in the nature of men, when collected for any purpose whatsoever into a body, to
take a selfish and interested bias, tending invariably towards the [i]ncreasing of their prerogatives and the prolonging of the term of their function ... ."); William Grayson, Speech
to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788), in 10 id. at 1444 ("[P]ower ... ought
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As the account of the debate in Philadelphia given above indicates,5 0 a proposal to flatly bar suspensions of the writ was defeated there, on the explicit premise that there were certain circumstances under which the exercise of this power would be
appropriate. This decision at the Convention, which Luther Martin
promptly made public,51 drew a good deal of fire during the ratification debates.
The gist of this opposition was that if the power of suspension
were granted to the federal government, "such worthy characters
as [Daniel] Shays and [his lieutenant Adam] Wheeler might be
forced into prison, confined there until their trial, and at length be
hung for attempting to introduce a desirable reformation in government. ' ' 52 As the French charg6 d'affaires wrote home in summa-

rizing this view: "The Congress will suspend the writ of habeas
corpus in case of rebellion; but if this rebellion was only a resistance to usurpation, who will be the Judge? the usurper."' 3 Accordingly, various commentators suggested that the proposed
Con54
stitution should be re-written to forestall these outcomes.
to be granted on a supposition that men will be bad"); Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 16, 1788), in id. at 1321 ("Look at the predominant thirst
of dominion which has invariably and uniformly prompted rulers to abuse their powers.");
William Lenoir, Speech to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 203-04 ("[lIt is the nature of man to be tyrannical ....
We ought to consider the depravity of human nature [and] the predominant thirst for power
which is in the breast of every one."); Samuel Spencer, Speech to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 25, 1788), in id. at 68 ("It is well known that men in power are apt to
abuse it, and extend it if possible."). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison)
(C. Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies
in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to controul itself."); Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 13,
1815), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 456 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959); Letter
from Nathaniel Barrell to George Thatcher (June 15, 1788), in 15 DocuMENTARY HISTORY,

supra note 4, at 372-73.
The roots of this attitude have been traced deep into American history. See T.H. Breen,
Looking Out for Number One: Conflicting Cultural Values in Early Seventeenth-Century
Virginia, 78 S. ATLAmc Q. 342, 349 (1979) (Virginia settlers of early 1600s "assumed that
persons in authority would use their office for personal gain").
50. See supra text accompanying note 22.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
52. Letter of A Briton to the Gazette of the State of Georgia (Dec. 13, 1787), in 3
DocuME rrARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 257.
53. Letter from Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Montmorin (Oct. 20, 1787), in 13 id.
at 424.
54. See, e.g., Letter of A Georgian to the Gazette of the State of Georgia (Nov. 15,
1787), in 3 id. at 240 (suggesting that the Clause read: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas
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The Federalists' response was that they shared the goals of
their opponents-which were fully implemented by the Constitutional text. Thus, in a speech to the Maryland legislature reporting
on his doings as a Convention delegate (and responding to the
views of Luther Martin), James McHenry said: "Public safety may
require a suspension of the Ha: Corpus in cases of necessity: when
those cases do not exist, the virtuous Citizen will ever be protected
in his opposition to power, 'till corruption shall have obliterated
any sense of Honor & Virtue from a Brave and free People. '55
As subsequent developments show, it seems fairly clear that
the Federalists won this debate.
III. THE

SOUNDS OF SILENCE

As they ratified the proposed Constitution, a number of states
passed sets of amendments that they wished to see incorporated;
James Madison collated these, and those that had achieved a reasonable degree of consensus among the states eventually became
the Bill of Rights.5 6 There were explicit safeguards for numerous
rights-from freedom of press and religion, to protections for the
civil jury trial, to a ban on cruel and unusual punishments-that
the Anti-federalists had warned would be in jeopardy under the
Constitution as originally proposed, and the entire project thus
represented a repudiation of the Federalist position that those and
other rights had already been sufficiently safeguarded. But there
was not a word about the right to habeas corpus, reflecting the fact
that (with one minor exception) the states had not proposed any
further protection for that right.5
Corpus shall remain, without any exceptions whatever, inviolate forever."); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 8 id. at 250 ("I do not like ... the
omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for... the
eternal & unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws. ..."); Dissent of the Minority of the
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 12, 1787), in 2 id. at 630 (calling for a Bill of Rights securing
"personal liberty by the clear and unequivocal establishment of the writ of habeas corpus").
See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander Donald (Feb. 7, 1788), in 8 id. at 354
(hoping that Constitution would be amended "by a declaration of rights ... which shall
stipulate... no suspensions of the habeas corpus"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Feb. 2, 1788), in 14 id. at 500 (containing same idea).
The exchange between Jefferson and Madison is more fully considered in Finkelman,
supra note 37, at 329-34, which observes that Madison was skeptical about the ability of any
constitutional guarantee against suspension of the writ, however phrased, to stand up
against the force of a passionate burst of public opinion.
55. James McHenry, Speech to the Maryland House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), in 14
DocumENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 283.
56. See generally Finkelman, supra note 37.
57. The exception was New York, which proposed an amendment, "That the writ of
habeas corpus shall not, by any law, be suspended for a longer term than six months, or
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A fair conclusion is that the ratification debates had convinced
all parties that the Clause as proposed would meet the aims they
agreed that they shared: to protect the liberties of those who might
fall afoul of the organs of power."' It follows from this premise
that, were they present among us today, the debaters would reject
modern formulations that see the federal writ of habeas corpus for
state prisoners as an assault on state sovereignty.59
until twenty days after the meeting of the Congress next following the passing of the action
for such suspension." Resolution of the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788), in 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 330. Even had this limited proposal had the support of
more states than it did, it likely would have had some difficulty in Congress; a similar suggestion in Massachusetts, see [John] Taylor, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 25, 1788), in 2 id. at 108; see also [Samuel] Nason, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Feb. 1, 1788) in id. at 137, had been laid aside when it was
pointed out that the suspension power in that state's constitution was limited to twelve
months, but "as our legislature can, so might the Congress, continue the suspension of the
writ from time to time or from year to year." [Francis] Dana, Speech to the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention (Jan. 26, 1788), in id. at 108. A proposal for a defined time limit on
suspensions had also been rejected in Philadelphia. See supra text accompanying notes 2022.
In addition to drafting and transmitting proposed amendments to Congress, a number
of states also adopted formal statements of political principles in connection with their ratifications of the Constitution. Two of these contained provisions concerning habeas corpus:
New York That every person restrained of his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful; and that such inquiry or removal ought not to be denied or delayed, except when, on account of
public danger, the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Resolution of the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788), in 1 ELLIoT'S DEBATES,
supra, at 328.
Virginia That every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy to inquire into
the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same if unlawful, and that such remedy
ought not to be denied or delayed.
Declaration of Rights of the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 27, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1552.
58. Another possibility is that those with concerns about habeas rights thought that
their desires would be met by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. However, in view of their
specificity in demanding safeguards for other rights, it seems unlikely that they would have
left a matter of such importance to generalized provisions.
59. The contrast is starkly presented by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
There, the Court ruled that a capital prisoner whose lawyer had filed his state habeas corpus
appeals papers three days late had thereby forfeited federal habeas corpus review. This decision was premised on the explicit view that the outcome represented the appropriate allocation of costs, between the interests of the State in avoiding federal review of its conviction
and those of the prisoner in not being executed pursuant to a possibly unconstitutional
judgment. Id. at 754. In a dictum that will live in infamy, the Court began its opinion, "This
is a case about federalism." Id. at 726. As Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion appropriately responded, and as I elaborate in the following paragraphs of text, a conception of
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Plainly, the Federalists were not worried about preserving
state sovereignty-neither in the sense of the dignity of the states
as against the federal government, nor in the sense of the rights of
state-wide majorities to act as they pleased towards their own citizens. With regard to the first, it was the over-abundance of reserved power in the states that led to the need to write the Constitution in the first place. 0 With regard to the second, it is clear that
checking the excesses of local majorities (like Rhode Island's) that
might act oppressively towards local minorities (like creditors) was
a major Federalist goal."1
As for the Anti-federalists, their contributions to the debate
over the Clause clearly show that they, unlike some modern Supreme Court Justices, were not worried about whether the states
would sufficiently retain their sovereign rights to imprison or execute people, but were, rather, worried about whether the states
would retain their sovereign rights to release them. In particular,
federalism that would justify the Court's result is simply the opposite of the founders'. See
id. at 758-762.
It is also a fair inference from the ratification debates that the participants would side
with the scholars rather than with the Supreme Court on the issue of the state courts' authority to issue the writ to federal prisoners. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
60. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 729 (1838).
[O]wing to the imbecility of congress, the powers of the states being reserved for
legislative and judicial purposes, and the utter want of power in the United States
to act directly on the people of the states, on the rights of the states (except those
in controversy between them) or the subject matters, on which they had delegated
but mere shadowy jurisdiction, a radical change of government became necessary.
Id.; MERRML JENSEN, THE ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION; AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIALCONST TUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERIcAN REvOLUTION 244-45

(1940).

I have set forth my views on this history in considerably more detail in Eric M. Freedman, Why ConstitutionalLawyers and HistoriansShould Take a FreshLook at the Emergence of the Constitution From the ConfederationPeriod: The Case of the Draftingof the
Articles of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REv. 783 (1993).
61. Madison made this argument for the new Constitution explicitly at several points in
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84, No. 43, at 275-77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (flagrant injustices of state
legislatures to private individuals critical to preparing national mind for reform of Confed-

eration); Henry Lee, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 9, 1788), in 9 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1074 ("If Pandora's box were on one side of me, and a
tender law on the other, I would rather submit to the box than to the tender law."); Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), in id. at 972-

73 (denouncing unjust and oppressive legislative acts since the Revolution); Speech of Jasper Yeates to Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 id. at 436, 439 (By

such enactments, "the government of laws has been almost superseded.... [But the Constitution will be] the glorious instrument of our political salvation."). See generally Letter XII
of The Landholder to the Connecticut Courant (Mar. 17, 1788), in 16 id. at 405 (denouncing
Rhode Island tender acts).
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they were concerned that federal power might be exerted so as to
keep unpopular prisoners-rightly or wrongly branded by the authorities as criminals-from vindicating their rights to freedom.62
From the Anti-federalist point of view, a power in the general government to release state prisoners, as opposed to a power in the
general government to forestall their release, would be an example
of federalism as a preserver of liberty6s-an instance of the virtue
of a federal, as opposed to a national, government.6 4
IV.

CONCLUSION: LISTENING TO HISTORY

The fact that both sides ultimately agreed that the Clause as
drafted met the goals that they proclaimed in common-as evidenced by the lack of any effort to amend it during the ratification
process-suggests that all parties read it as protecting broadly
against Congressional interference with the power that federal and
state courts were each assumed to possess: to order the release on
habeas corpus of both federal and state prisoners.

62. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
63. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will controul each other; at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.").
64. As Henry J. Bourguignon, The FederalKey to the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 46 S.C. L.
REv. 647, 647-51 (1995) has recently reminded us, the shared belief of the founding generation-Federalists and Anti-federalists alike-in the liberty-preserving virtues of federalism
(conceived of as concurrent state and federal power over as many subjects as possible) provided the basis for many important compromises, both in Philadelphia and afterwards. I
would add that the same was true before Philadelphia, see Freedman, supra note 60, at 826
(discussing drafting of Articles of Confederation), and might yet be true today. See Eric M.
Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two Legislative Proposals for
EvaluatingPost-TrialEvidence of Innocence in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 315, 324 (1990-91).

